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ABSTRACT
In this paper we provide some econometric evidence on the impact of
financial factors like cash flow, debt and stock measures of liquidity on
theinvestmentdecisions of U. K. firms. These variables are introduced via
an extension of the Q model of investment which explicitly includes
agency/financial distress costs. We discuss if the significance of cash
flow may be due to the fact that it proxies for output or because it is a
better measure of market fundamentals than Q. Moreover we investigate if
the effect of financial factors varies across different types of firms,
according to size, age, and type of industry (growing and declining). We
analise the determinants of the magnitude of the cash flow effect and
explain why caution must be exercised in attributing inter—firm differences
only to differences in the importance of agency or financial distress costs.
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4ost empirical models of company investment rely on the assumption of perfect capital markets. In a
world without taxes, one implication of this assumption is that firms are indifferent to funding their
nvestment programmes from internal or external funds. However, there is a rapidly growing body of
iterature eximining the possible existence of imperfections in capital markets and their effects on firm's
inancial and real decisions. In this paper we provide some econometric evidence on the impact of
inancial factors like cash flow, debt and stock measures of liquidity on the investment decisions of UK
firms. These variables are introduced via an extension of the 0 model of investment which explicitly
ncludes agency costs. We discuss if the significance of cash flow may be due to the fact that it proxies
for output or because it is a better measure of market fundamentals than Q. Moreover we investigate if
Lhe effect of financial factors varies across different types of firm. The cross—sectional variation of the
impact on investment of flow and stock measures of liquidity has been analysed also by Fazzari et al
(1988) and by Gertler and Hubbard (1988) for US firms and by Hoshi et al (1988) for Japanese firms.
The former studies distinguish between firms according to their divided payment behaviour, while the
latter classify firms according to i.strengthof their institutional relationships with banks. Instead, we
group observations according to firm size, age and type of industry (growing and declining). The
empirical importance of this breakdown is a natural subject of investigation and moreover allows us to
minimise the problems of endogenous selection. In the theoretical section we outline a simple model
that illustrates how cash flow can be introduced in Q models. We discuss the determinants of the size
of the cash flow effect and explain why caution must be exercised in attributing inter-firm differences
only to differences in the importance of agency or financial distress costs.
In section 1 we briefly review recent contributions to the literature on credit market imperfections, and
in section 2 we show how features appearing in these models might be expected to influence investment
decisions. Section 3 develops a simple extension of the investment model with adjustment costs which
explicitly allows for agency costs of external finance. Section 4 describes the behaviour and performance
of a sample of 720 UK manufacturing firms, split by size and age, and section 5presentssome
1econometric results, obtained using instrumental variable, which indicate that financial factors, princip
in the form of lagged cash flow, do have an independent effect on investment. Section 6 briefly
concludes.
2 Thc Cost of External Finance
Duringthe lastfew years there has been a renewed interest in understanding the relationship betwee
investment and financing decisions, both at the theoretical and empirical level. The common theme
underlying the various contributions is the lack of perfect substitutability between inside and outside
financing. The existence of differential information and incentive problems make external finance mor
costly than internal finance. In this setting the availability of internally generated funds and/or of assi
that can be used as collateral may have an effect on investment decisions.
Let us briefly review the disadvantages and benefits of external finance. Starting with debt finance, th
are different reasons why there may be a conflict between shareholders and debtholders, giving rise t
agencycosts of debt. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that stockholders will have an incentive to
engage in projects that are too risky and so increase the possibility of financial distress and bankrupt
If successful, the payoff to the owners of the fIrm is large. If unsuccessful, the limited liability provisi
of debt contracts implies that the creditors bear most of the cost. Myers (1977) suggests that if the
firm is partly debt-financed, it may underinvest in the sense that it foregoes projects with a positive i
present value. This problem is particularly severe when assets in place are a small proportion of the
total value of the firm. Other areas of conflict between bondholders and shareholders are representec
by the claim dilution resulting from the issue of additional debt and by the possibility that the firm c
pay out excessive dividends financed by reduced investment.
Since potential creditors arc assumed to understand the incentives facing stockholders and are aware
the risk of bankruptcy when loans are negotiated, ultimately the owner will bear the consequences of
these agency problems in terms of a higher cost of debt. With asymmetric information about borrowe
quality, rationing may also occur (See Jaffe and Russell, 1976, Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). As a way to
control the conflict between bondholders and shareholders and to minimise the agency cost of debt,
2bond covenants are observed, limiting the discretionary action of the owners regarding dividends, future
debt issues, and maintenance of working capital (Smith and Warner, 1979). Debt covenants usually
contain a maximum limit on the amount of dividends that can be paid out which depends positively
upon accumulated earnings. Restrictions on the minimum value of the ratio between tangible assets and
debt, working capital and debt and, finally, between interest payments and cash flow are also common.
The greater is the amount of debt in the firm's capital structure, the more severe the incentive
problems become, and the more likely it is that the firm will face financial distress and ultimately
bankruptcy. Because of the less favourable terms on which debt can be obtained and because of the
cost associated with tighter monitoring and bonding activities, agency costs are therefore likely to be
increasing in the level of debt. On the other hand it is likely that such costs are a decreasing function
of the level of past and present earnings and of assets, particularly if liquid in nature, that can be used
as collateral.
While agency costs make debt less attractive, the tax deductibility of interest payments make it more
attractive. In the absence of such costs, debt is preferred to retentions if (1— m)/(1 —z) >1—t, where
m is the marginal personal tax rate on interest income, z the tax rate on capital gains and t the
corporate tax rate (King, 1977). In the UK this inequality is satisfied for most investors1.
New share issues may be disadvantageous because of transaction costs, tax reasons or asymmetric
information. Informal evidence on transactions costs in the UK suggests that there are large fixed costs
in issuing new equity2. The tax dis/advantage of new share issues relative to retentions in a classical
system of company taxation depends upon the relationship between personal tax rates on dividends, m,
and capital gains, z. If an is greater than z, as it is usually the case, new equity issues are relatively
more expensive (see, for example, King, 1977). In an imputation system, like the one in existence in the
UK since 1973, the situation is more complex. New share issues are a cheaper source of finance for a
1 However, the possibility of negative profit, combined with corporate tax asymmetries, reduces the
effective corporate tax rate because there may not exist taxable profits against which to offset interest
payment. This reduces the tax advantage of debt (see DeAngelo and Masulis, 1980, Auerbach 1986 and
Mayer, 1986).
2 For example, typical transactions costs in raising £5millionwould be around £250,000, compared with
only £500,000 for raising £50 million.
3full tax paying firm if (1—m)/((1—z)(1--c)) >1,where c is the rate of imputation. This condition
be satisfied for institutional investors for whom m —z=0and for other investors with a low marginal 1
rateon dividends3.
Finally, new share issues may be more costly because of asymmetric information. Myers and Majiuf
(1984) suggest that, if managers have inside information, it may happen that the latter is so favourabli
that management, acting in the interest of old shareholders, will not issue new shares because they
perceive them as being underpriced. Investors will therefore interpret the decision to issue new shares
as a bad signal. In this case new equity finance can only be obtained at a premium, because of the
adverse selection problem.
Up to this point in the discussion we have implicitly assumed that management acts in the interest of
shareholders. Allowing for the possible divergence of interest between managers and outside
shareholders provides an additional rationale for the disadvantage of external finance. If managers hay
a less than 100% ownership stake in the company, they will be encouraged to use a greater than
optimal amount of firms resources in the form of perquisites (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Such
activities can be monitored by the outside shareholders, but such monitoring is costly and the insiders
will ultimately bear the cost in terms of a reduced price that prospective outside shareholders are
willing to pay for a stake in the firm. This consideration suggests that the cost of outside financing is
related to the stake of insiders and to the dispersion of outside ownership.
3 Financial Factors and Investment Decisions
What is the effect of credit availability, cash flow and collateralizable assets on investment decisions?
The literature on this issue has been conducted in the context of models with different structures
3 The existence of a high allowance for capital gains results in a zero marginal tax rate for investors
earning less than about £6000 per year in the form of capital gains. One should in addition consider
the possibility that firms may not be able to offset their advance corporation tax against the mainstrea
corporation tax. This implies thatthe effective rate of imputation is smaller than the statutory rate,
making new share issues less attractive (Keen and Schiantarelli, 1988).
4oncerning information and technology.Onegroup of papers adds financial considerations to standard
Ivestment models based on the assumption of convex adjustment costs, usually estimated usually in
ieir 0 form. For example, credit rationing with an exogenously given ceiling can be easily added to 0
iodels.Ifthere are tax advantages to debt, firms will borrow up to capacity. Under the standard
ssumptions, (perfect competition, constant returns to scale, a single quasi-fixed factor) marginal 0 will
ontinue to equal average 0, with the caveat that the present value of the interest payments net of new
ebt issued should be added to the market value of shares in defining average 0. The present value of
iese flows can be approximated by the current value of the stock of debt. One could also assume that
ie maximum amount of debt is a fixed proportion of the capital stock (Summers, 1981) with basically
w same result.
Uternatively one could include in the objective function an additional cost term, increasing in the level
I debt, that summarises the agency/financial distress cost of debt, as in Chirinko (1987). In this case.
n internal solution for debt can be obtained. If the agency cost of debt is linear homogeneous in its
rguments and the change (as opposed to the level) of debt does not enter the agency cost function,
iarginal 0 again equals average 0. If the change in debt does appear in the agency cost function and
ie latter is not linear homogeneous, the difference between marginal and average 0 depends upon the
resent and future values of the change and level of debt (Chirinko, 1987).
Vhen personal taxation is taken into account and if capital gains are taxed less heavily than ciividends,
ne can distinguish between three financing regimes5. In regime 1, investment can be financed at the
iargin by retentions, positive dividends are paid and no new shares are issued. In regime 3, the firm
sues new shares and pays no dividend. In the intermediate case, regime 2, both dividends and new
tiare issues are zero and the marginal source of finance is debt. A relationship between investment and
ut-adjusted average 0, can be derived only in the regimes 1 and 3. In the last regime no such
Iationship exists and investment equals cash flow plus new debt issued. In this context, an increase in
ash flow makes the probability that investment is financed at the margin by retentions more likely and
See also Steigum (1983) and Bernstein and Nadiri (1986) v e the cost of borrowing is made an
icreasing function of the debt/equity ratio.
Edwards and Keen (1985) discuss what happens when dividends are tax favoured and a maximum
mit is imposed on their distributions, as is the case in the UK.
5this can be shown to increase investment (Hayashi, 1985). However, conditional on 0. cash flow does
not have an additional explanatory power in the regimes 1 and 3. in regime 2, increases in cash flow
(and debt) translate into a one to one increase in investment and 0 does not matter.
Fazzari Ct a!. (1988) extend 0 models by including a premium for issuing new shares, based on the
adverse selection argument put forward by Myers and Majluf (1984). The existence of this premium
increases the cost differential between internal finance and new equity and it increases the likelihood
that the firm will find itself at the point of discontinuity where all profits are retained, no dividends
paid and firm's future prospects are not good enough to induce it to issue new shares. For those fin
Q does not matter, while cash flow does matter.
In another group of papers the role and consequences for investment of informational imperfections
more closely analysed. In this context the amount of net assets that can be used as collateral is a
determinant of the agency cost of external finance and has an effect of investment. The particular
informational asymmetry and the details about technology differ across papers, but the common them
is that insiders have less incentive to cheat and more incentive to act in the interest of outside
investors when their stake in the project is greater (see the contributions by Bernanke and Gertler,
1989, Gertler, 1988 and Gertler and Hubbard, 1988). The Link between firm's value and the fraction c
entrepreneur wealth invested in the project is also emphasised by Leland and Pyle (1977). Since
borrower's net worth is likely to be procycical, incentive problems may be particularly severe in a
recession. This may lead to an asymmetric effect of financial variables on investment during the
business cycle.
The existence of informational asymmetries that restricts the firms' ability to raise external equity play
a crucial role also in the paper by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1988). They show that production and
investment depends upon their equity position. Since there is only Limited access to equity markets, th
main way to change firms' equity is to accumulate cash flow, net of financial obligations. All these
models imply that an increase in collateralizable net worth may stimulate investment. The more precis
modelling of the informational asymmetries and of the possibility of bankruptcy is clearly a strength o
these models. However, they do not yield an investment equation that explains how financial factors a
expectations about firms' prospects jointly determine investment.
64 From Theoty to Testing
The empirical importance of financial variables, in particular cash flow and stock measures of liquid
assets, charactcriscs many econometric studies of investment based on firm by firm data (see Fa.zzari et
al., 1988, and Gertler and Hubbard, 1988, for the US, Hayashi and Inoue, 1988, and Hoshi et al., 1983,
for Japan and Blundell et al., 1988, for the UK). Most of the testing has been conducted in the
context of 0 models in which average 0 is used to control for the investment opportunities open to
firms. Fazzari et al. and Gertler and Hubbard analyse the cross sectional variation in the importance of
financial factors by classifying firms according to their dividend payout behaviour, while Hoshi et al.
make a distinction between firms with and without strong links with a single bank.
We discuss the role of financial factors in the context of a simple variant of a 0 model of investment.
The model includes on the cost side a term, A, representing agency/financial distress costs which is a
function of the stock of debt, B, the capital stock, K, the stock of liquid assets L and cash flow, X.
Debt and liquid assets are chosen endogenously, together with investment and new share issues. On the
basis of the arguments of the pr. 'ous section, agency costs are an increasing function of debt and a
decreasing function of cash flow and of liquid assets. The agency cost function is expected to vary for
firms in different age and size classes and in different industries. The reasons why this may be the case
are summarised in section 4. Moreover there is a premium that must be paid for issuing new shares.
This way of summarising informational asymmetries and the risk of bankruptcy is obviously ad hoc. It is
adopted here to provide some unifying principle to our discussion and to our empirical testing and to
make clear the implicit assumptions underlying the type of equations that have been used so far to test
for the importance of fmancial factors in equations containing average 0. In particular, we want to
specify a model that is consistent with the fact that cash flow may matter (albeit differently) for all
firms, and not only for those that have used up all retentions and are not issuing any new shares.
Under the assumption of perfect competition, linear homogeneity of the production, adjustment and
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where A denotes the partial derivative of the agency cost function with respect to cash flow, X1
the marginal shadowvalue of capital,p' the output price, p the investment price, all in period t, T
the corporate taxrateand \1thetax discrimination parameterbetweendividendsandretentions, equal
to(1—m)/((1— z)(1 — c)). Thelinear homogeneity assumption, although not necessarily realistic, allows
oneto showthatthefollowingrelationshipholds between themarginaland average valuesofthe
capital stock:
1R) (2;
where V is the market value of firms' shares at the beginning of period t, R is the market return on
equity and the Xs are the shadow values of the state variables. If the firm is on its optimal path, it is
possible to show that B1 =(Y+L't)(1+ R/(1 —z))where LD is the multiplier on the non-negativity
condition for dividends. Similarly,X'1 =(y+[D1)(l+ R/(1 —z)).If positive dividends are paid, as is
almost always the case in our sample, the multiplier, is zero. Using this result in (2) and taking a
first order approximation of (1) around sample averages or steady state values we can write:
1Q÷2()3() + (3)
where I/K denotes investment expenditures and
(V1/v÷B—L)(1+1---)_______ Q— . -z_ t (4) (1 —o)K(1—T)pr (l—t)p'
The coefficients, denoting sample averages or steady state values by bars, are:
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where subscripts again denote partial derivatives.
This equation suggests that the coefficient in front of average 0 reflects both the adjustment cost
parameter b and the derivative of the agency cost function with respect to cash flow. The coefficient of
cash flow is positive if Ay,X/K >0,as is reasonable to assume (ie. increasing cash flow reduces
agency costs at a decreasing rate). The coefficient increases with the average investment rate. It also
depends upon average cash flow/capital, debt/capital, liquid assets/capital. Similar comments apply to
the coefficients of B/K and L/K, the signs of which depend on the cross partial derivatives of A. If
the agency cost function is additively separable in the pairs (X, K), (B, K) and (L, K), the last two
regressors can be omitted and the coefficient of X/K depends only upon the average cash flow to
capital ratio (in addition to the investment rate). Unless more specific assumptions are made about the
functional form of A little can be said a priori on its effect on the size of the coefficient and this is a
source of ambiguity in forecasting the expected strength of the effect of cash flow, debt and liquid
assets on investment for different 'vpes of firms. Aside from this ambiguity, we allow the agency cost
function to be displaced upward or downward by a multiplicative constant which is specific for each
group of firms and therefore varies according to size, age and sector. An increase in the constant
unambiguously increases the coefficient of cash flow, debt and liquid assets.
There are several reasons why the agency cost function may vary across firms. First, it might be
expected that young and small firms may be at a disadvantage, ceteris paribus, when raising external
finance. Younger firms are likely to be a riskier prospect since the shorter track record makes it more
difficult to judge their quality. Moreover smaller firms often tend to be less diversified, to display
greater earnings volatility, and to be more prone to bankruptcy (Titnian and Wessels, 1988). However,
there are also reasons why it might be the case that incentive problems are more severe for finns in
which insiders own a smaller proportion of the firm and outside ownership is more dispersed. Since
size may proxy for ownership structure, there is some ambiguity in assessing the effect of size on
9agency cost. Finally, it is intuitively more probable that firms in declining sectors may face financial
distress. The second hand market for capital goods is likely to be less active, the liquidation value of
assets to be smaller and, therefore, the cost of financial trouble greater in this case.
We have assumed so far that positive dividends arc being paid, because this is what our data suggest5
happens most of the time. In this case the first order condition on new shares issues implies that
y—1—W + = 0,where Wt is the marginal adverse selection premium firms have to pay when
issuing new shares, and 11N1isthe non-negativity constraint on new equity issues. If Wtisindepender
of VN as in Fazzari et al. (1988), then we need to assume that 'j is less than 1 +Wt, otherwise it
would pay to finance continuous new dividend distributions by issuing new shares. If the above
condition holds, firms will not issue new shares and pay dividends at the same time. In order to
provide a satisfactory rationale for an intsrnal solution for dividends and new share issues, it would bt
necessary to provide an analysis of the signalling role of dividends and of the possibility of tax
exhaustion, but this goes beyond the purpose of this paper. The specification of 0 models when the
various asymmetries of the tax schedule are explicitly modelled is contained in Devereux at a!. (1989)
where it is shown that an internal solution for dividends and new share issues can be obtained becaus
the possibility of tax exhaustion reduces the effective value of y.Alternativelyit must be assumed that
persona] tax rates vary across investors and that the condition y=1+W1 determines the marginal
investor in the case of an internal solution.
5Intra-FirmDifferences in Financing, Investment and Profitability in the UK
In this section we discuss how financing, investment, profitability and other characteristics vary across
different types of firms according to size, age and sector. The results presented here are based on a
sample of 720 firms in the UK manufacturing sector over the period 1969-1986, quoted on the Londor
Stock Exchange. Because of births and deaths and an increase in the number of firms available in 197
the number of records on each firm varies between 4 and 18; only 89 firms existed for the entire
sample period. Data have been obtained from two sources. Accounting data on each firm has been
provided by Datastream, and market valuations have been taken from the London Share Price
10Database. These two sources have been merged for each firm in each year to provide the data used in
this paper6. These firms account for approximately 65 per cent of total investment in manufacturing
between 1977 and 1985. The construction of the variables follows that in Blundell et al. (1989).
Company investment includes direct purchase of new fixed assets and those acquired through
acquisitions. The firm's market value is an average for the threee month's prior to each accounting
year. Replacement cost estimates of the capital stock are estimated using the perpetual inventory
method7.
The discussion above implied that there are several reasons why one might expect the location of the
agency cost function to differ across firms. Given its location, the expectation of the relative effect of
financial factors on investment would also depend on their relative investment ,rates, and their cash
flow, debt and other liquid assets relative to their capital stock. In this section we present some
evidence on the relative sizes of these ratios and more generally on firms' characteristics according to
size, age and whether they operate in a growing or declining sector.
It is also worth commenting briefly on the difference between these splits (by size, age and sector) and
that used by Fazzari et a!. (1988). Fazzari et al. split their sample of firms according to their dividend
payout ratios. This was an attempt to identify those firms which were likely to pay no dividends and at
the same time did not find it profitable to issue new shares. In the US, this may be reasonable
(Fazzari et al. show that, among their group of firms having a low payout rate, that dividends are paid
only 33% of the time). However, in the UK the vast majority of firms pay dividends every year while
some firms also raise external equity finance fairly frequently. Without explicitly modelling why firms
pay dividends —forexample, because of a possible signalling role (see for instance John and Williams
(1985), Ambarish et at. (1987) and Edwards (1987) for a critical discussion) —itis not clear which
firms are constrained by their earnings and which are not. For example, if cutting dividends is taken to
be a negative signal, firms which have paid high dividends in the past will be forced to maintain a high
6 The LSPD data is needed to calculate Tobin's 0.
7 Further details are available from the authors on request.
11dividend strate'.Alternatively, following Easterbrook (1984) and Rozeff (1982), it might be argued rh
firms with a more widespread ownership are required to pay a higher dividend because this implicitly
forces them to submit to scrutiny from the market when they raise external funds.
In TabLe 1 we present some summary statistics when each observation on each firm is classified into
one of three size categories according to the real value of the capital stock (1980 prices) at the
beginning of the preceding period (pK -2).Theobservation is classified as small if pK 2isLess than
£6million,medium if pK 2isbetween £6 million and £50 million, and large if pKisabove £50
million. Note that as firm grows, it may move from one group to the other. As explained in the next
section, we split the sample according to the size of pK, in order to minimise problems of
endogenous selection in estimation. The table indicates that investment and cash flow, each as a
percentage of the end of period capital stock, decrease with size. This is particularly true of cash flo'.
with small firms generating a return of 18% compared to only 11% for large firms. Ceteris paribus, th
existence of higher cash flows for small firms makes it less likely that they will face financial
constraints. The dividend payout ratio is higher for larger firms, although this appears to be mainly du
to the fact that depreciation (the difference between cash flow and profit) represents a higher
proportion of cash flow for large firms; the average dividend to cash flow ratio is remarkably constant
across the three size categories. The frequency with which dividends are paid increases with size, but
even for small firms however, the average dividend payout ratio is approximately 34% and dividends ai
paid 89% of the time.
Prima fade evidence that internal sources of finance are preferred to external sources is represented b
the fact that investment is financed mainly through retentions, which constitute about 67% of the total
sources of funds. Perhaps surprisingly, the proportion of funds raised from retentions by large firms is
almost identical to that raised by small firms. New equity varies between 12 and 15% of total new
8 Splitting by payout behaviour is more open to criticism from this point of view
9Inorder to allow for any distortion to these results arising from measurement error in K, a similar
split was performed using the real value of sales two periods earlier as a measure of size. The results
were very similar.
12TabLe 1Split by Size
Case 1 PKt2 <£6m
Casc2 £6m<pK_2<L50m
Case 3 PS-2 >£50m
percent
Case1. Case 2 Case 3
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1. Total funds are the sum of retentions, new equity and the change in long term and short term debt.
2. 'Market value' is taken as the market value of equity plus the book value of debt.
3. Current assets comprise inventories and work in progress, financial investments, the stock of cash and
trade debtors less trade creditors and other short term liabilities (excluding short term debt).
4. 0 is defined in equation (4). V1 is measured at the beginning of the period.
13fi•10. The frequency of new share issues increases with size. The lower frequency of new equity
issues for small firms is consistent with the observation that flotation and underwriting costs are an
decreasingfunctionof the value of the issue.
Longtermdebt represents a small percentage of investment finance especially for smaller firms. This
suggests that it is expensive for small firms to rely on market debt. Note, however, that the percentage
of new finance derived from short term debt (with maturity of less than one year) is greater for
smaller firms. The vast majority of their short term debt is provided by banks. This indicates chat the
difficulty of borrowing in the open market may be partly relieved by the ability to borrow from
institutions that can more easily monitor the borrower through a continuing relationship. It is not clear
however, that the duration of bank debt matches the requirements imposed by investment projects that
will provide a return over a long period of time.
A final piece of interesting evidence from Table 1 is the standard deviation of real sales growth falls
with size although this effect is not very large. The slightly higher figure for small firms may be
reflected in the relatively high ratio of current assets to the capital stock, in that such firms may find i
useful to maintain a sizeable reserve of liquid assets in order to buffer the volatility of sales revenues
and to avoid being forced to borrow on unfavourable terms. Moreover, this ratio is one of the indices
commonly used by lenders to judge the credit worthiness of potential borrowers. Other indicators of th
ability to meet financial obligations is the ratio between interest payments and cash flow, which is
smaller for smaller firms. By presenting a healthy liquid asset position firms may be able to reduce the
cost of borrowing.
Table 2 presents some independent evidence on the degree to which financial factors are perceived to
influence the investment decision of different sizes of firms. The figures are taken from the quarterly
survey of UK manufacturing industry conducted by the Confederation of British Industry. It indicates
that over the period 1981 to 1986 virtually a third of the respondents cited some financial factor as
constraining their investment (although it is hard to distinguish the three questions related to financial
factors). The most striking feature of the table is, however, the proportion of the largest firms which
10 Mayer (1988) claims that the proportion of funds raised from new share issues is somewhat lower,
although our figures are in line with official statistics (Dli Business Monitor, MA)).
14cited "shortage of internal finance" as a significant constraint on their investment. While the sample of
finns in this category is low11, this does suggest that very large firms may face financial constraints. The
table suggests1 however, that slightly less large firms (in the third category) face somewhat lower
financial constraints.
TabLe 2 Evidence from CBI Industriai Trends Survey of UK Manufacturing companies
Average response to the question: "What factors are likely to limit (wholly or partly) your capital
expenditure authorisations over the next 12 months?" over the period 1981 to 1986 (24quarterly
surveys)
Percent
Size by number of employees
Whole 0-199 200-499500-4999 more than
sample 5000
Inadequate net return on proposed investment39.5 26.3 38.5 41.7 46.5
Shortage of internal finance 21.2 15.4 15.5 8.5 29.2
Inability to raise external finance 2.6 3.0 2.3 2.1 2.9
Cost of finance 8.5 10.6 8.5 8.0 8.4
Uncertainty about demand 46.3 56.7 52.8 48.2 36.9
Shortage of labour (inc. man & tech staff) 3.1 3.7 3.5 2.4 3.1
Other 2.3 2.0 2.8 2.4 2.4
N/A 12.2 14.2 9.6 10.3 13.4
Another dimension that has a potential bearing on investment and financing decisions, especially in the
presence of asymmetric information, is the firm's age. Although we do not have exact information on
each firm's age, we do know when firms went public. In Table 3, we distinguish between observations
on firms that have been quoted for at least 12 years and observations on firms younger than 12 years.
In this table we examine only small and medium-sized firms (ie. pK -2lessthan £50 million). Since
11 Between 25 and 60 out of a sample of around 1250.
15larger firms arc almost exclusively more than 12 years since their first quotation, they would all fall into
the old" category. By concentrating on the remainder, we consider firms which, apart from age, arc
more nearly alike.
Tablc3 SplitbySizeandAge
Case 1 pK_2 <£50m;less than 12 years since first quotation
Case 2 pK_2 <£SOm;more than 12 years since first quotation
Casel Casc2
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1. See notes to Table 1.
Within this size category, new firms have a higher investment rate and cash flow. The payout ratio is
fairly stable across the two categories. New firms have a higher use of retentions, and also derive a
16slightly larger fraction of new funds from new share issues. The higher profitability and investment of
the new firms is reflected in a higher value of 0. There is little variation in the standard deviation of
sales growth, thus suggesting that sales volatility does not depend to any great extent on firm age.
It was also suggested above that the location of the agency cost function, and hence the degree to
which companies face financial constraints depends on the sector in which it is operating. We have
therefore also considered the difference between companies in growing and declining sectors, this time
conditioning on size by splitting the sample according to whether pK1_2 is greater or less than £10
million. (The state of manufacturing industry in the UK in the 1970s and early 1980s was such that a
majority of our sample of firms belonged to sectors which declined over the period considered). As
might be expected, comparing firms of similar size, both investment and profitability is, on average.
higher for firms in growing sectors. Again, however, the average dividend payout ratios are very similar
across the different categories. Further, no clear pattern emerges concerning the use of differen
sources of finance, although small firms in growing industries make less use of retention finance (only
59%oftotal new funds).
6 Empirical Results
What does the empirical evidence say about the role of financial factors in investment decisions for UK
firms? We start our discussion from the results obtained from estimating equation (3) for the entire
sample. We wish to allow for the possibility of time specific and firm specific effects. Introducing the
subscript i to distinguish companies, we therefore wish to estimate
(6)
Thestochastic term, v11, arises from disturbances to the adjustment cost function, as in the standard 0
model. There is nothing in the theory which restricts this term to be an innovation error, and indeed,
related research estimating the 0 model on similar data has suggested that v follows an AR(1)
process (Blundell et al., 1988). To allow for this possibility, lagged values of the dependent variableand
17of each regressor are included in the equation (although we estimate the model without imposing the
common factor restriction). The lagged values may, of course, also reflect the ambiguities involved in
choosing the timing of the various variables.
The model has been estimated in first differences to allow for firm specific, time invariant effects12 and
an instrumental variable procedure is used to allow for the endogeneity of the regressors. This
endogeneity arises because current cash flow, debt, current assets, 0 and investment may all be
simultaneously determined (although Q, unlike the other variables, is constructed by dating it at the
beginning of the period). In addition, care must be taken to allow for the possibility of measurement
error, particularly in 0. As well as contemporaneous values of these variables being invalid instruments,
flrst—differencing introduces the correlation between, for example, 0t1 and v1_ i into the equation. In
the absence of serial correlation in v11, however, further lags of each of the regressors are valid
instruments. Thus, in the third period, variables dated t =1may be used as instruments in the
differenced equation (as well as 0, if it is uncorrelated with v1,). Similarly, in the fourth period,
variables dated t =1and t =2 are valid instruments. Since this gives more instruments in later periods
and since vit may be heteroscedastic across companies, we use an application of Hansen's (1982)
generalised method of moments estimator. However, computing restrictions13 force us to restrict the
instrument set. Below we denote the instrument set used in the form eg. Q(n,m), where n indicates that
the latest lag used is dated —n,and in indicates the number of lags used14.
12 Related research (Blunddll et al., 1989) has indicated that the presence of firm specific effects can
lead to biased estimated coefficients when the model is estimated in its levels form. In addition, the
presence of the lagged dependent variable in the more general equation makes the within—groups
estimator inconsistent for dynamic models with small T (Nickell, 1981).
13 We have used GAUSS 1986, version 1.49B, in which the instrument set must be restricted to 90
Instruments. Thanks are due to Manuel Arellano and Stephen Bond for allowing the use of their
GAUSS programs in this work.
14 For in =1, the GMM instrument set differs from simply usingeg.,essentiallyby allowing the
reduced form coefficient to vary over time.
18In column 1 of Table 4 we present the estimated coefficients for the equation containing, in addition to
Q and lagged investment, both flow and stock measures of liquidity and the stock of debt'5. Time
lummies are included as regressors and instruments in all equations. The results suggest that
contemporaneous Q is a significant determinant of investment although, as in most other empirical
.tudies, the size of its coefficient is small. Cash flow, especially dated t— 1,plays an important role with
ilargecoefficients. The coefficient on contemporaneous debt is negative and significant, as one would
expect if an increase in cash flow decreases the marginal agency cost of debt, so that AX.B/X< 0(see
(5)). The stock of liquid assets does not play a significant role in this equation. Dropping liquid assets
from the model in column 1 has very little effect on the other terms in the equation.
These results are generally robust to variations in the instrument set. The equation does not exhibit
second order serial correlation (see the M2 statistic) which would invalidate the instrument set.
Moreover, the Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions suggests that the instruments are not correlated
with the error term. -isincluded in the instrument set. the coefficient on contemporaneous Q
falls, which is consistent with the possibility that downwards bias due to measurement error in 0
outweighs any upward bias due to the possible endogeneity of 16Thisresult is also found when the
same comparison is made for the oLher equations presented below, and so we generally exclude Q -
fromthe instrument set.
The positive effect of the lagged investment rate and the negative coefficient on the lagged Q term are
consistent with an AR(1) error term in the underlying equation. However, the positive coefficients on
both the cash flow terms is inconsistent with this explanation of the dynamic structure. (Replacing
(X/pK)1 with (X/pK)1_2 provides a result consistent with the AR(1) process although this would imply
15 We have experimented with alternative empirical measures for gamma. The results are very similar
whatever measure is used. The results are also not sensitive to the inclusion of the discount factor, R,
in the definition of Q. In the tables we report the results obtained when gamma and the discount
factor are set equal to one.
16 In principle, including Qt-2inthe instrument set may also introduce measurement error since it
also appears as a regressor in the differenced equation, although in later tables the first—differenced
-isomitted since it is not significant for subsamples of the data. This issue has been explored in
detail by Blundelleta! (1989) on the same data set and our choice of instrument set is consistent with
their results.
19Table 4 THE FULL SAMPLE









































































2.Asymptotic standard errors are reported in parentheses. Standard errors and test statistics are
asymptotically robust to heteroscedasticity across companies.
3.m2 is a test for second-order serial correlation in the residuals, asymptotically distributed as
N(O,1) under the null of no serial correlation. See Ardllano and Bond (1988).
The Sargan statistic is a test of the over-identifying restrictions, asymptotically distributed as
4. X(k)
W is a Wald test of the joint significance of the time dummies, asymptotically distributed as
s.X2(k)under the null of no significance.
6.The instrument sets are explained in the text.
that lagged cash flow, not current cash flow, should be in the specification in equation (3)). This
suggests that the timing of the impact of cash flow in investment is more complex than suggested by
the model in section 3. Intuitively, the significance of lagged cash flow may be explained if external
investors may observe only cash flow in the previous period, or, more generally, may judge the firm's
credit worthiness using a weighted average of past cash flows17.
In column 2 of Table 4 we explore what happens when debt is excluded from the model (debt is
rarely significant in the subsamples of the data examined below, mainly due to the fact that less data is
available). The positive effect of contemporaneous cash flow disappears in the absence of the negative
effect of contemporaneous debt, while lagged cash flow becomes more important. The coefficient on
current 0 falls slightly.
In Column3lagged and twice lagged output as a proportion of the replacement value of the apital
stock is added to this specification (contemporaneous output is not significant). Their coefficients are
neither individually nor jointly significant. However, note that the negative coefficient on current output
is consistent with the presence of imperfect competition, which introduces an additional wedge between
17 This would require in the inclusion of X -andfurther lags in the agency cost function described
in section 3.
21.marginal and average 0, which depends on the present value of current andfuture output18. The
wedge captures the loss of monopoly profits due to the decrease in price associatedwith the additional
output produced by new investment. Adding output to the equation to some extent proxiesfor the
wedge, and therefore we would expect a negative coefficient19. We explore this issue further belowfor
different subsamples of the data.
The presence of output in the equation has little effect on the coefficient of lagged cash flow. Its
remaining significance suggests that even if cash flow is to some extent proxying for demand, this is not
the main reason for its importance. The principal model investigated below is a parsimonious version of
column 2ofTable 4, dropping lagged 0 and current cash flow (which are individually and jointly
insignificant). The size and significance of the other variables is virtually unchanged when these two
terms are omitted.
One reason for the significance of cash flow is that it may be a better proxy for market fundamentals
than the market value of the firm and entrepreneurs may respond only to fundamentals (Blanchard et
a!., 1988). In this case one would expect that during periods of potential speculative bubbles or fads in
the tock market, the coefficient for 0 and cash flow should be different, compared with other periods.
In particular one may expect that 0 matters less relative to cash flow in such periods. It is obviously
difficult to identify unambiguously when bubbles or fads caused share prices to be a poor reflection of
fundamentals. During the years covered by our estimation, the years between 1981 and 1986 are
18 More precisely, omitting debt, liquid assets and taxes, it can be shown that
(1 +R)!'- 1+R)p1Y, K ttNI
(1-o)K1
where•L isthe elasticity of demand.
19 However, if the equation is estimated in a quasi-differenced form as suggested by Schiantarelli and
Georgoutsos (1988) and Galeottj and Schiantarelli (1988), the contemporaneous investment rate, given
scaled' past investment should be positively related to (Y/K)1 —. Whenthis variable is added to our
specification alone, it is rarely significant. This issue deserves additional investigation.
22possible candidates; average price—earnings ratios have been consistently higher from 1981 onwards then
over the previous 10 years. While this may, of course, simply reflect more optimistic expectations, this
may also reflect the existence of a bubble.
We have therefore re-estimated the specification used below, for example in Table 5,allowingall of the
slope coefficients to differ between the two subperiods. However, there is no strong evidence of a
structural break. The Wald test statistic for the joint significance of the three additional terms (each
variable interacted with a dummy equal to I for the period 1981 to 1986 and 0 otherwise) is 6.83
(compared with a critical value of 7.81 at the 5% significance level). In addition, the coefficient on
lagged cash flow for the whole period was 0.2951 (with standard error 0.0462), while that for the
additional variable lagged cash flow from 1981 to 1986 only was —0.0982(with standard error of
0.0607). If Q —isincluded in the instrument set, the three additional terms become jointly significant
(with a Wald statistic of 15.3). The same pattern arises for the cash flow terms, and additionally in this
case, the coefficient on 0 from 1981 to 1986 only is positive and significant. Any support for a
structural break which might be found in these results would therefore be in the opposite direction to
what would be expected if cash flow were merely proxying for market fundamentals. Rather, it seems
that in the relative boom years of (he 1980s firms were simply less financially constrained and hence
cash flow was less important. The asymmetric effect of cash flow on investment during booms nd
recessions is emphasised by Gertler and Hubbard (1988). Of course, it may be that cash flow proxies
both for market fundamentals and financial constraints, but that the change in the latter dominate in
the 1980s. This is an issue that deserves further investigation. However these initial results suggest that
fads and bubbles are not the key explanation as to why cash flow is significantly related to investment.
The arguments summarised in the previous section suggest that cash flow and other financial variables
may have a differential impact across different types of firms. In Table S we present the results on the
effect on cash flow for firms of three different sizes ("small", "medium" and "large'). We also consider
"very large" firms (which are a subset of the group of 'large" firms). Note that observations are
classified according to the size of the capital stock at the end of time t —2.,pK_2. Under the
assumption that the error term in the levels equation is not serially correlated, pK -2 is predetermined
23Table 5 SPLIT BY SIZE
Case 1 pK_2 <£6m
Case 2 £6m <PKt.2<£50m





















































Instruments I/K(2,1), 0(2,2), CF/pK(2,1), Y/pK(2,1)
Notes
1. See notes to Table 4.
with respect to the error term in the differenced equation. Current assets were not significant when
added to the various equations. In addition, current cash flow and further lags of cash flow and 0
weregenerally insignificant when added to the equations presented.
Consider, first, cases 1, 2 and 3. The coefficient on cash flow is significant for all classes of firms.
Perhaps surprisingly, it is greater for large firms, although there is not a statistically significant
difference between the coefficients for large and small firms at normal significance levels (the t-statistic
24for the significance of the difference between the two coefficients is 1.13)°. The coefficient and the
significance of current 0 increases across the size categories; for small firms 0 appears to have no
impact on investment, while for large firms, the coefficient on 0 is much greater. Given the increasing
coefficient on cash flow as size increases, we also consider whether the impact of cash flow for large
firms is dominated by very large firms. The results shown in case 4 show that this may be the case;
although the coefficient on cash flow for very large firms is less precisely determined (due to fewer
observations) the significance of the difference between it and that for small firms is slightly higher
(with a t—statistic of 1.50).
These qualitative results are invariant to alternative instrument sets. However, the significance of both
the 0 and cash flow does vary with the instrument set. In particular, if Q.. is included in the
instrument set, current 0 is statistically significant for medium, large and very large firms although the
estimated coefficients are slightly lower. In addition, the differences between the cash flow coefficients
are more significant (with t-stacistics of 1.68 for the difference between small and large firms and 1.88
for the difference between small and very large firms).
With one main exception, adding other regressors has little impact on the coefficients and standard
errors presented in Table 5.Theexception occurs when current output is added to the model for large
firms. The coefficient on current output for large firms is —0.0106with standard error 0.0026. Its
negative sign is again consistent with the possibility that output is reflecting the existence of imperfect
competition since large firms are more likely to be in a position to exploit the benefits of monopolistic
competition. The coefficient on curent cash flow for large firms increases substantially when curent
output is included, although it is less precisely estimated. Current debt also has a negative sign but is
not significant when added to the models in Table 5.Addingdebt tends to increase the difference in
the coefficients on cash flow between case 1 and case 3 firms, although their standard errors also
increase.
) We need to test the hypothesis that the difference between the cash flow coefficients equals zero.
On the assumption that the error terms are independent across the two categories, the appropriate
standard error is simply the square root of the sum of the squares of the two standard errors on the
two coefficients. This allows a simple t-tcst to be performed on the difference between the coefficients.
25In the context of the model sketched in the previous section, the size of the coefficient on cash flow
for large firms cannot be accounted for by a higher investment rate of large firms (sec (4)), because it
is, in fact, lower. It could be explained by the lower cash flow/capital ratio that characterises larger
firms, if the coefficient of cash flow decreases with this ratio. It is easy to find paraineterisations of the
agency cost function that yield this result21. This factor may be dominant since differencesin the
investment rate are not very large and neither is the difference in the riskiness as measured by the
variance of sales. It is also possible that the differential according to size may capture industry effects.
Finally, it is possible that, ceteris paribus, agency costs may be more severe when insiders effectively
controlling the firm hold a lower fraction of the equity and/or outside equity holdings are more
dispersed. Size may proxy for the effect of these factors on the severity of the incentive problems.
Two criticisms might be made with regard to splitting firms according to the replacement cost value of
the capital stock two periods ago. One is that there may remain some endogeneity introduced by serial
correlation in the error term (although we do not find such correlation). The second is that whatever
effects size is proxying for, an alternative would be to split by the size of a firm relative to the size of
otiAer firms in the industry in which that firm operates. Thus a 'small firm overall may seem larger
relative to other firms in its own industry. To meet these possible criticisms, we first split firms
according to their initial size (that is, their size when they first entered the database). Of course, this
takes no account of the rate of growth of a firm since it entered the database, and possibly as a result,
there is much less variation in the value of the cash flow coefficient between different size classes of
firms measured by initial size. However, in Table 6, we present the results of splitting firms according
to their initial size relative to that of other firms in their industry which are also in the database. Thus,
case 1 firms are among the smallest 75% of firms in their industry measured by initial size and case 2
firms are among the largest 25%.Itis clear from the table that the results concerning cash flow are
21 This would be the case, for example, if, ignoring liquid assets
A —{_a(X/K)a+b(B/k?)k
where O<a<1, or if
-1—(x/K)(8/K)k
where a<O.
26similar to those in Table 5 (indeed the size and significance of the difference across the two categories
is greater in Table 6; the t—statistic on the difference between the two cash flow coefficients is 1.84).
By contrast, however, 0 appears more important for the smaller firms. This latter result may be partly
due to grouping together all 'non-larg& firms in the first column.
Tabic 6 SPLIT BY INITIAL SIZERELATIVETO DISTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRY
INiTIAL SIZE
Case 1pI( within smallest 75% of firms in the same industry






























Instruments I/K(2,1), 0(2,2), CF/pK(2,1), Y/pK(2,1)
Notes
1. See notes to Table 4.
While we do not have any data on ownership patterns, we can control for industry. An interesting
distinction, as suggested above, is between growing and declining sectors. Table 7 contains the results of
the size/sector split (using only two categories for size). Due to the small number of observations in
some of the categories, parameters are estimated with less precision than in other tables. The perhaps
surprising result from Table 7 is that the coefficient on cash flow is greater for firms operating in
27growing sectors. This is true even if the long run impact of cash flow is considered. This table also
mirrors the result that cash flow is more important for large firms, with the largest coefficient being for
large firms in growing sectors. This result is not sensitive to the instrument set used. One explanation
for this effect maybethat the lower investment rate of firms in declining sectors dominates empirically
their lower cash flow and their higher agency costs which, ceteris paribus, would be expected to arise.
The table indicates that the impact of 0 is mixed: among small firms it is more important for firms in
declining sectors but among large firms it is more important for firms in growing sectors.
The final issue we wish to explore is the effect of age on the relevance of cash flow. In Table 8 we
report the results obtained when, excluding large firms, we distinguish between firms that have been
quoted for more or less than twelve years. Twelve years may seem rather long, but it is imposed by the
necessity of having enough observations in the "new" firms category for the purposes of estimation. The
results suggest that cash flow is somewhat more important for new firms, although the differences
between the two categories are not large. Once again, it should be noted that the category of new
firms is very small, and that the variables consequently tend to be less significant.
28Table 7 SPLIT BY SIZE AND SECTOR
Case 1 pI ,2< £lOm;growing sectors
Case 2 pK 2< LiOm; decliningsectors
Case 3 pK -2> LiOm; growingsectors





















































Instruments I/K(2,1) 0(2,2), CF/pK(2,1), Y/pK(2,1)
Notes
1.See notes to Tables 4 and 5.
2.Growing sectors are: chemicals and man-made fibres, electrical and instrument engineering and
food, drink and tobacco. Declining sectors are: metals and metal goods, other minerals and
mineral products, mechanical engineering, motor vehicles and parts and other transport equipment,
textiles, clothing, leather and footwear and other industries.
29Table 8 SPLIT BY SIZE AND AGE
Case 1 pK —2< £SOm;less than 12 years since first quotation






































1. See notes to Tables 4 and 5.
7 Conclusions
The results discussed in this paper suggest that in all cases cash flow is significantly associated with
investment. Stock measures of liquidity do not play an important empirical role. The stock of debt does
appear to have a negative impact on investment, although the significance of this term depends on the
size of the sample. The performance ofis mixed. While it plays a significant role in the full sample,
there are subsamples, typically of small firms, in which it does not appear to have an independent
effect on investment. The results for the full sample over different time periods suggest that the
30significance of cash flow is not due solely to the fact that, in proxying for demand., it is a better
measure of fundamentals than 0, nor simply that it contains new information not captured by beginning
ofperiod 0, although more research is needed on this issue.
Cash flow does appear to differ across firms in the magnitude of its impact on investment. In
particular, it appears to play a more important role for large firms than for small firms. While this may
be surprising at first sight, there are several reasons why this effect might be observed. For example, it
may reflect the fact that large firms tend to have a lower relative cash flow. In addition, it may reflect
the possibility that large firms have a more diverse ownership structure, which tends to increase agency
costs. Given size, the effect of cash flow tends to be larger for firms in growing sectors, contrary to
what one would expect since collateralizable net worth is likely to be larger in this case and the risk of
bankruptcy lower. However, firms in growing sectors need to finance a higher rate of investment.
Finally, when firms are classified according to age, it appears that cash flow matters somewhat more for
newer firms, as would be expected since information asymmetries are likely to be larger for such firms,
and they need to finance a higher investment rate.
Our results suggest that capital market imperfections should be an important ingredient of any extension
to or reformulation of the adjustment cost model of investment. However, the mixed performance of 0
suggests that such extensions should be pursued in future work22.
22 For example, see Chirinko (1984) and Hayashi and Inoue (1988) for 0 models with multiple capital
inputs, Galeotti and Schiantarelli (1988) for a 0 model which with imperfect competition and labour as
a quasi—fixed factor and Bond and Meghir (1989) for an adjustment cost model which avoids the use of
stock market values and parameterisation of the gross production function.
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35</ref_section>APPENDIX
Thefirm maximises themarketvalueofthesharesofexistingshareholders, V:
j'1
1 +R {yD
-( 1 + w,)) (1 1)
whereD denotes dividends, I
-
7 newshares issued, W the sample selection premium,
y=(1—m)/(1—z)(1—c), with m denoting the tax rate on dividend, z the tax rate on capital gains and
c the rate of imputation. R is the market rate of return on equity, assumed to be constant for
simplicity.
The maximisation is subject to the definition of sources and uses
(1—T)p'fl(KI)—1I(V B, L, P.K,)+ I+B1+L(1 +(1
—
D+pI+(1+i(1 -T))B1+ (I2)
where Tthe corporate tax rate, p the price of output, Pt the price of investment goods, [I real
revenues net of variable costs, K capital stock, B debt, L1 liquid assets, i the rate of interest on debt
and Ltherate of interest on liquid assets. For ease of notation we omit depreciation allowances, then
are included, however, in the empirical work. X is defined as
-(1-t)fl-(I+1(1-T))B, +(1+L( 1-T))A
The capital accumulation equation is
(43)
andthe non-negativity conditions are￿0 andD >0.
Thefirstorder conditions are:
36(y+)[(1 -A,(1+l)(1 --r)pfl1(1)— P1]+X =0 (.14)













+(y+ i)[( I - 4(t))( 1+(1- t)i) + (')1) = 0 (.19)
+ (y+ [(1 - A.(1))( 1+(1 - T)iL)+ .4L(t)]} = 0 (.4 10)
ksdenote the multipliers associated with the state variables and .t f)andJ..1' the multipliers associated
with the non-negativity condition for D1 and 1 '.(A4)to (AlO) together with the complementary
slackness conditions summarise the conditions for an optimum.
37If we assume that the adjustment cost function is separable and has the form[( ) — c 12 K ,
equation(A4) yields (1) in the main text when D >0so that=0.
Inorder to obtain the relationship between the marginal and average value of the capital stock,
equation (2) in the main text, multiply (A4) by ! (A5) by K, (A6) byV, (A7) by B+i, (AB) by
+,(A9)by B1, (AlO) by L1 and add them together. Solve the resulting difference equationforward
and note that (A7) and (A9) imply that = + 1 + that (A8) and (A9)
imply that X.= (y + t..)(
1 + Thisyields equation (2) in the main text.
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